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Let the Dummy Talk!- Unilateral Communication and Discrimination inThree-Person Dictator Experiments -

Greiner, Ben; Güth, Werner; Zultan, Ro’i - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866851

Vertical Cross-Shareholding Theory and Experimental Evidence

Güth, Werner; Nikiforakis, Nikos; Normann, Hans-Theo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

This paper analyzes vertical cross-shareholding, that is, the mutual holding of a minority of shares between vertically related firms. We investigate the conditions under which cross-shareholding improves efficiency. First, we explore the issue in a game-theoretic model and find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866872

When to Coalesce: Early versus Late CoalitionAnnouncement in an Experimental Democracy

Goodin, Robert E.; Güth, Werner; Sausgruber, Rupert - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

In multi-party democracies, several parties usually have to join together in coalitionto form government. Many aspects of that process have been fairly fully investigated,others less so. Among the latter is the timing of the formation and announcement ofcoalitions.1While the dominant popular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866941

Fair Wages and the Co-Employment of Hired and RentedHands- An Experimental Study –

Alewell, Dorothea; Friedrich, Colette; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additionallabour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employmentof hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rentalagency. This may cause severe problems if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866944

The Eect of Group Identityin an Investment Game

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The present research experimentally examines the ininfluence of groupidentity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment,group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial(minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionallyrelated by outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866946

Effective equity experiences from an ultimatum experiment

Güth, Werner; Kovács, Judit - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

experiment determines endogenously whether unfair offers are detected andsanctionable. In our experiment a proposer and a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866948

Loss aversion and learning to bid

Dittrich, Dennis Alexis Valin; Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Bidding challenges learning theories since experiences with the same bid vary stochastically:the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss. In such an environment thequestion arises how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affectsthe adaptive dynamics. We analyze...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866949

Bargaining Outside the Lab –A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Güth, Werner; Schmidt, Carsten; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2005

In a large scale newspaper experiment 5,132 readers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three … experiment. Furthermore, student behavior is not different from non-student behavior when the same age group is considered …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867078

Tax morale and optimal taxation : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Behavioral Public Economics, July 2004

Güth, Werner; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2004

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450920

Gender differences in yielding to social influence : an impunity experiment

Di Cagno, Daniela; Galliera, Arianna; Güth, Werner; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/86, pp. 1-12

’s counterfactual generosity intention. For a given pair of proposer candidates each states, via the strategy vector method, an intended … either possibly upward or downward adjusted depending on the counterfactual offer of the other proposer candidate. The … that counterfactual intentions of others often affect own generosity via substantial and significant average adjustments to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014804