We study herd behavior in a laboratory ?nancial market with ?- nancial market professionals. An important novelty of the experi- mental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows us to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects?decisions for all realizations of their...

We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after observing their predecessors and a private signal. They are unable to understand their predecessors’ decisions in their finest details: they only understand the relation between the aggregate...

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We analyze a financial market à la Glosten and Milgrom, in which informed and uninformed traders trade in sequence with a...

We study whether the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted risk preferences, comparing the results of experiments conducted before and during the outbreak. In each experiment, we elicit risk preferences from two sample groups: professional traders and undergraduate students. We find that, on average,...

We run an experiment where professional traders, endowed with private information, trade an asset over multiple periods. After the trading game, we gather information about the professional traders' characteristics by having them carry out a series of tasks. We study which of these...

We study the stability of noncognitive skills by comparing experimental results gathered before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a sample of professional traders, we find a significant decrease in agreeableness and locus of control and a moderate decrease in grit. These patterns are...

We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...

We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...