The purpose of this study is to investigate the firm-level factors effect on the audit pricing in China and Pakistan. For this purpose, we used the panel data of 160 firms of each country of study for the period from 2005 to 2011. First, we run the combined model for two countries and observed...

This study explores the association between audit market concentration, audit quality, and audit fees in US audit markets. It contributes to the extant literature by modelling the interactive effects of the structural characteristics of audit markets on audit quality and pricing. Based on a...

Both the GAO (2003, 2008) and the US Treasury (2008) have implied that the Big 4 dominated US audit market lacks competition. More recently, the PCAOB has expressed a somewhat different concern, i.e., that because audit committees may be primarily interested in negotiating a lower audit fee...

We examine why US-listed foreign companies choose to have a US-based (rather than home country-based) Big N firm as their principal auditor for SEC reporting purposes and the effects of that choice for audit fees and earnings quality. We find that the likelihood of the Big N principal auditor...

The purpose of this study is to investigate the firm-level factors effect on the audit pricing in China and Pakistan. For this purpose, we used the panel data of 160 firms of each country of study for the period from 2005 to 2011. First, we run the combined model for two countries and observed...

Following the findings from marketing and management literature on corporate reputation, we develop a new proxy to measure the audit office reputation and examine the impact of this measure on audit fees and audit quality. We argue that the presence of reputable clients and their tenure with the...

Prior studies have examined the effect of a decline in the auditor's or client's reputation on auditor switching, market shares, and stock prices. We extend these studies by examining the effect of an unexpected increase in a client's reputation on audit fees at the office level. We argue that...