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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010006913
We explore the determinants of yield differentials between long-term sovereigen bonds in Europa area. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with the measure of tghe international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable hetrogeneity and no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001733928
The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005481763
The paper explores the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds in the Euro area. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041833
We explore the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds in the Euro area. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of the international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041875
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042222
We present a positive theory of capital market frictions that raise the cost of capital for new firms and lower the cost of capital for incumbent firms. Capital market frictions arise from a political conflict across voters who differ in two dimensions: (i) a fraction of voters owns capital, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133657
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518801
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete-contracts framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518813