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Delegation in a vertically differentiated duopoly

BARROS, Fatima; GRILO, Isabel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695301

Delegation in a vertically differentiated duopoly

BARROS, Fatima; GRILO, Isabel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703557

Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly

Barros, Fatima - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 13 (1995) 3, pp. 373-386

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005500046

Delegation in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly.

Barros, Fatima; Grilo, Isabel - In: Manchester School 70 (2002) 1, pp. 164-84

In a context of vertical product differentiation we analyze the effect of delegation on quality levels. We consider a duopoly where firms can delegate the quality-determining activities to an agent. The realization of the random cost associated with the quality level is known, at no cost, by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005177443

Asymmetric information as a commitment in oligopoly

Barros, Fatima - In: European Economic Review 41 (1997) 2, pp. 207-225

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005224421

Delegation in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

BARROS, Fatima; GRILO, Isabel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1993

In a context of vertical product differentiation we analyze the effect of delegation on quality. We consider a duopoly where firms can delegate to an agent the quality determining activities. The quality level is determined by the level of a random fixed cost. The actual realization of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065284