Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

We develop a nonparametric instrumental variable approach for the estimation of average treatment effects on hazard … abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced … unemployment duration is positive and significant. Neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

We develop a nonparametric instrumental variable approach for the estimation of average treatment effects on hazard … abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced … unemployment duration is positive and significant. Neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute …

estimation of Timing-of-Events (ToE) models. We exploit rich Swedish data of unemployed job-seekers with information on … approach provides accurate effect estimates, especially if time-varying variation in the unemployment rate of the local labor …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

estimation of Timing-of-Events (ToE) models. We exploit rich Swedish data of unemployed job-seekers with information on … approach provides accurate effect estimates, especially if time-varying variation in the unemployment rate of the local labor …