Bank bailouts are not the "one-shot" events commonly described in the literature. These bailouts are instead dynamic processes in which regulators "catch" financially distressed banks; "restrict" their activities over time; and "release" the banks from restrictions at sufficiently healthy capital...

Liquidity creation is one of banks’ raisons d’être. But what happens to liquidity creation and risk taking when a bank is identified as distressed by regulatory bodies and subjected to regulatory interventions and/or receives capital injections? What are the long-run effects of such...

We examine the effects of competition on bank risk. We find strong evidence that interstate banking deregulation — which generally increases bank competition — is associated with lower bank risk and some evidence intrastate branching increases bank risk. Further, interstate banking reduces...

We investigate benefits to business borrowers from bank bailouts – specifically the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Applying difference-in-difference methodology to loan-level data, we find more favorable contract terms in five dimensions – spread, amount, maturity, collateral, and...

We study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support (bailouts) on banks' liquidity creation. We rely on instrumental variables to deal with possible endogeneity concerns. Our key findings, which are based on a unique supervisory German dataset, are that regulatory interventions...

We investigate whether saving Wall Street through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) really saved Main Street during the recent financial crisis. Our difference-in-difference analysis suggests that TARP statistically and economically significantly increased net job creation and net hiring...

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks' cost of equity (COE) using changes in interstate bank branching laws over the post–Riegle-Neal period (1994:Q4–2016:Q4). We find strong evidence that deregulation increases banks' COE. This is driven primarily by active acquirers,...

We model dynamic bank capital structure under three optimally-designed regulatory regimes dealing with potential default { bailout, where government provides capital; bail-in, using private-sector funds; and no regulatory intervention, allowing failure. Only under optimally designed bail-in do...

Despite ample research demonstrating many consequences of bank geographic deregulation, the bank capital determinants literature has not directly tested the effects of this deregulation. This paper fills this important research gap. We find strong evidence that geographic deregulation...

The recent financial crisis highlights the importance of both regulatory and market discipline. Government reactions to the crisis included expanding deposit insurance coverage and rescuing troubled institutions, including some institutions that might not otherwise be considered too important to...