Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of …

Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to identify consumers' problems and determine … appropriate services for solution. Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to correctly identify … problems and consumers being able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis, we introduce heterogeneously qualified experts. We …

market efficiency in a setting in which experts need to invest in costly but unobservable effort to identify consumer … problems and consumers are able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis. We introduce heterogeneously-qualified experts … Sisyphean task, as theory predicted. Nevertheless, we observe high skilled experts investing significantly less effort in …

diagnosis and service. Consumers can visit multiple experts, which enables an endogenous verifiability of diagnosis. We show …We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but … unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of …

Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to identify consumers' problems and determine … appropriate services for solution. Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to correctly identify … problems and consumers being able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis, we introduce heterogeneously qualified experts. We …

diagnosis and service. Consumers can visit multiple experts, which enables an endogenous verifiability of diagnosis. We show …We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but … unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low …