This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and...

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and...

We study discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear-quadratic rational expectations models. In contrast to the assumptions that pervade this literature we show that these models do have multiple equilibria in some situations. We demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria by...

In this paper we consider the quadratic optimal control problem with regime shifts and forward-looking agents. This extends the results of Zampolli (2003) who considered models without forward-looking expectations. Two algorithms are presented: The first algorithm computes the solution of a...

Recent policy formulation has emphasised targeting rules. These often lead to policy problems which are singular, and need special solution techniques. We set out solutions for the control of singular linear rational expectations models with quadratic objectives. These are both time inconsistent...

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are...

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in duopoly games. First, it is shown that the two necessary (and sufficient, if both satisfied) conditions for sequential play to emerge at equilibrium are that both leader and follower are at least weakly better off than under simultaneous play....