The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign public officials. We uncover an unintended consequence – the shadow economies of the countries of these officials increase after FCPA enforcement. Our hypothesis is that if the FCPA successfully deters...

Despite the rapid growth of emerging donors, these non-traditional donors are historically left out of the discussion on aid effectiveness. In this paper, we provide the first full evaluation of aid agency best practices. We rank and compare DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors,...

Using data from 2004-2008-2012, we provide the first multi-year agency monitoring of Development Assistance Committee (DAC), multilateral, and United Nations (UN) agencies. Our results suggest that, on average, DAC donor performance has declined while multilateral and UN agency performance has...

Foreign aid critics, supporters, recipients and donors have produced eloquent rhetoric on the need for better aid practices – has this translated into reality? This paper attempts to monitor the best and worst of aid practices among bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies. We create aid...

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits US firms from paying bribes to foreign public officials. We show that FCPA enforcement has no positive effect on the GDP per capita of the countries of these officials but, rather, increases their countries’ shadow economy. When public...

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits US firms from paying bribes to foreign public officials. We show that FCPA enforcement has no positive effect on the GDP per capita of the countries of these officials but, rather, increases their countries shadow economy. When public officials...