Primary healthcare institutions (PHIs) in China have experienced a sizable decline in medical services in recent years. Despite the large regional disparities in China, there is a lack of evidence on the differential patterns of medical services offered by PHIs, especially from a spatial...

Primary healthcare institutions (PHIs) in China have experienced a sizable decline in medical services in recent years. Despite the large regional disparities in China, there is a lack of evidence on the differential patterns of medical services offered by PHIs, especially from a spatial...

This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal...

Doing "more" in healthcare can be a major threat to the delivery of high-quality health care. This study used coarsened exact matching to test the hypothesis of supplier-induced demand (SID) by comparing health care utilization and expenditures between patients affiliated with healthcare...

Doing "more" in healthcare can be a major threat to the delivery of high-quality health care. This study used coarsened exact matching to test the hypothesis of supplier-induced demand (SID) by comparing health care utilization and expenditures between patients affiliated with healthcare...

Doing "more" in healthcare can be a major threat to the delivery of high-quality health care. This study used coarsened exact matching to test the hypothesis of supplier-induced demand (SID) by comparing health care utilization and expenditures between patients affiliated with healthcare...

We provide a modeling framework to think about selective contracting in the health care sector. Two health care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal...

We provide a modeling framework to think about selective contracting in the health care sector. Two health care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal...

This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal...

This paper introduces a workhorse model to analyze the effects of provider and insurer competition in health care markets. The two contracting imperfections we focus on are the following: (i) whether or not a patient should be treated and (ii) treatment quality are both not contractible. We...