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Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686932
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587848
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Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568127
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010670654
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Qingmin - 2013
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080181
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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (Second Version)
Liu, Qingmin - 2012
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098363
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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726
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A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation
Lazarova, Emiliya A. - 2006
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733871
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315