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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003811430
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349197
Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organizations. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare positions of the actors. While such an analysis informs us about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377381
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338005
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011280073
In the literature, there exist several models where a cooperative TU-game is enriched with a hierarchical structure on the player set that is represented by a digraph. We consider games under precedence constraints introduced by Faigle and Kern (1992) who also introduce a generalization of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010464783
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227326
There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477095
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434059