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Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth communication

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760424

The importance of the distribution of consumers in horizontal product differentiation

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Journal of regional science 42 (2002) 4, pp. 793-803

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001729017

Social networks and crime decisions : the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behaviour

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001778609

Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth communication

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001630175

Who's who in crime networks : wanted - the key player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002123916

Does crime affect unemployment? : The role of social networks

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Annales d'économie et de statistique (2003), pp. 173-188

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002133152

Social networks and crime decisions : the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: International economic review 45 (2004) 3, pp. 939-958

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002186624

Social networks and crime decisions : the role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behaviour

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001801322

Who's who in crime network : wanted the key player

Ballester, Coralio (contributor); … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002007765

Delinquent networks

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831247