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The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

Casajus, André - 2012 - This version: November 30, 2012

We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In … this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615 … player axiom. -- Shapley value ; gain-loss axiom ; differential marginality ; efficiency ; additivity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009680709

Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities

Hüttner, Frank; Casajus, André - 2019

result using efficiency, anonymity, and marginality or independence, which generalizes Young‘s characterization of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010357

The Coleman-Shapley-index : being decisive within the coalition of the interested

Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - 2018

The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844627

Amalgamating players, symmetry and the Banzhaf value

Casajus, André - 2010 - November 2010, this version: December 10, 2010, 7:40

. Further, we explore symmetry implications of Lehrer's 2-efficiency axiom. -- Banzhaf value ; amalgamation ; symmetry ; 2 …-efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008757963

Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values

Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - 2012

The Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578187

Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value

Casajus, André - 2011 - This version: September 19, 2011

We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311608

A property rights based consolidation approach

Casajus, André; Labrenz, Helfried - 2014

We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure whithin the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239888

Solidarity and fair taxation in TU games

Casajus, André - 2012 - This version: July 12, 2012

We consider an analytic formulation/parametrization of the class of efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU games that, in contrast to previous approaches, which rely on the standard basis, rests on the linear representation of TU games by unanimity games. Unlike most of the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565677

Nullifying vs. dummifying players or nullified vs. dummified players : the difference between the equal division value and the equal surplus division value

Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - 2012 - This version: July 11, 2012

We provide new characterizations of the equal surplus division value and the equal division value as well as of the class of their convex mixtures. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value is pinpointed to one axiom....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565680

The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

Casajus, André - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252272