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Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002111567

Compensation consultants and executive pay : evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Conyon, Martin J.; Peck, Simon I.; Sadler, Graham V. - In: Academy of Management perspectives : AMP 23 (2009) 1, pp. 43-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003833231

Lower salaries and no options? : on the optimal structure of executive pay

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 62 (2007) 1, pp. 303-343

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003425906

Struktur und Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung in börsenorientierten Unternehmen

Dittmann, Ingolf - In: Die Ökonomie der Aktie : [Dokumentation des Symposiums …, (pp. 37-53). 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975688

Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation

Conyon, Martin J.; Peck, Simon I. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612430

Executive compensation and incentives

Conyon, Martin J. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612602

The prince and the pauper? : CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom

Conyon, Martin J.; Murphy, Kevin James - In: Corporate governance and corporate finance : a European …, (pp. 371-397). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003613469

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compension?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-chia - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874411

Shareholder voting and directors' remuneration report legislation : say on pay in the UK

Conyon, Martin J.; Sadler, Graham - In: Corporate governance : an international review 18 (2010) 4, pp. 296-312

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008658634

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949