Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general...

Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general...

This paper provides theory and evidence relating information asymmetries and agency costs to exit outcomes in venture capital backed entrepreneurial firms. Where venture capitalists are able to better mitigate information asymmetries and agency costs faced by the new owners of the firm, they...

We examine theory and evidence on agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other controls, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more investors, broaden the geographic investor...

In this paper we examine for the first time the role of agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other potential determinants, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more...

In this paper we examine for the first time the role of agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other potential determinants, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more...