Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent...

We explore how the demand for a risky asset can be separated into an investment effect and a hedging effect by all risk-averse investors. This question has been shown to be complex when considered outside of the mean-variance framework. We restrict dependence among returns on the risky assets to...

In the literature, utility functions in the expected utility class are generically limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. This paper extends the concepts of order of...

The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning within the context of a multi-period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring et...

We analyze the empirical relationship between opportunistic fraud and business cycle. We find that residual opportunistic fraud exists both in the contract with replacement cost endorsement and the contract with no-deductible endorsement in the Taiwan automobile theft insurance market. These...

The study of risk management began after World War II. Risk management has long been associated with the use of market insurance to protect individuals and companies from various losses associated with accidents. Other forms of risk management, alternatives to market insurance, surfaced during...

The ability and willingness of health care workers to report for work during a pandemic are essential to pandemic response. The main contribution of this article is to examine the relationship between risk perception of personal and work activities and willingness to report for work during an...

Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In...

This paper studies comparative risk aversion between risk averse agents in the presence of a background risk. Although the literature covers this question extensively, our contribution differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, background risk does not need to be additive or...

This paper studies comparative risk aversion between risk averse agents in the presence of a background risk. Although the literature covers this question extensively, our contribution differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, background risk does not need to be additive or...