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Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590

Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay

Falk, Armin; Menrath, Ingo; Verde, Pablo Emilio; … - 2011

health, and fairness of pay. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601022

Living in two neighborhoods: Social interaction effects in the lab

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - 2009

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277490

Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes

Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - 2013

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319464

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264349

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268924

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Macleod, W. Bentley - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333911

Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - 2010

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269827

Reference points and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264587

Reference points and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269296