that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects’ cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …

preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized … peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an …

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … towards the defectors but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However …, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished …