Over 10 years ago, Feld and Voigt (2003) introduced the first indicator for objectively meas-uring the actual independence of the judiciary and demonstrated its utility in a large cross-section of countries. The indicator has been widely used, but also criticized. This paper pre-sents more...

Die Einkommens- und Vermögensverteilung hatte sich in Deutschland vor dem Beginn der Finanzkrise zunehmend ungleich entwickelt, seitdem aber ist die Ungleichheit zurückgegangen. Ob Ökonomen beurteilen können und sollen, was eine "richtige und gerechte" Einkommensverteilung ist, bleibt...

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers' ability to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we first...

How a sustainable fiscal policy can be performed in a federal system is not only a Swiss problem but is also discussed in other federal countries like Germany and Austria, and in the European Union. Contrary to most other countries, the Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal...

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual...

L'Etat fédéral suisse est l'un des pays dont le pouvoir fiscal est le plus décentralisé. Cette décentralisation se vérifie particulièrement dans le cadre des impôts sur le revenu et la fortune des personnes physiques d'une part et, celui des impôts sur le bénéfice net et le capital...

The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups...

In diesem Beitrag werden die ökonomischen Argumente, die für und gegen Wettbewerbsföderalismus sprechen, zusammengefasst und mit der empirischen Evidenz aus stark wettbewerblich organisierten Föderalstaaten konfrontiert. Es zeigt sich, dass fiskalischer Wettbewerb zu einer effizienteren...