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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346883
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An experimental study on the effects of communication, credibility, and clustering in network games
Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - 2019
networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network … structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging … outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024395
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An experimental study on the effects of communication, credibility, and clustering in network games
Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - 2019
networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network … structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging … outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012006270
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357
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Price Discrimination Through Communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246715
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Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738407
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The pivotal mechanism revisited: some evidence on group manipulation
Feri, Francesco; Gantner, Anita; Höchtl, Wolfgang; … - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 1, pp. 23-51
subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for communication within subgroups in one … symmetric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we find little evidence for tacit collusion. Only when explicit communication is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988968
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
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Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 99-136
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599506
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549