adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a … formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation …

adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a … formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation …

adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a … formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation …

multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to … span of control is larger and incentives are distorted towards more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field … experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised …

We study the compensation of gig workers in a natural field experiment. To derive testable predictions, this paper …- creasing in her risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability. We then predict the effects of introducing a gig piece rate … risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability. …

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the …

adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a … formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation …

adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a … formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation …

By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent …'s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …