This paper examines how entrepreneurs and incumbents differ in R&D strategies. We show that entrepreneurs have incentives to choose projects with higher risk and a higher potential in order to reduce expected commercialization costs. However, entrepreneurs may still select too safe projects from...

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing, which assumes that entry can occur only by installing new capacity, by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the...

Entrepreneurs face higher commercialization costs than incumbents. We show that this implies that entrepreneurs will choose more risky projects than incumbents, aiming to reduce their high expected marginal commercialization cost. However, entrepreneurs may select too safe projects from a social...

This paper examines how entrepreneurs and incumbents differ in R&D strategies. We show that entrepreneurs have incentives to choose projects with higher risk and a higher potential in order to reduce expected commercialization costs. However, entrepreneurs may still select too safe projects from...

Entrepreneurs face higher commercialization costs than incumbents. We show that this implies that entrepreneurs will choose more risky projects than incumbents, aiming to reduce their high expected marginal commercialization cost. However, entrepreneurs may select too safe projects from a social...