This paper analyzes a procurement setting with identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction. The reason is that holding an auction may leave...

I compare an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting where a noncontractible signal about the quality that each firm is able to supply is observed by the procurer and all competing firms. Signals are affected by firms noncontractibleinvestments in R&D and the procurers precision of...

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochasticinnovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents...

This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined ina two dimensional characteristic space, and consumers do not know which firm sells whichquality. Equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which balance consumers' relativevaluation of goods'...

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firmsshare the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress thedifferences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resultingfrom the traditional example...

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence inputand output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under adecreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant....