When there is significant overlap in potential partner airlines' route networks, policymakers have expressed concern that an alliance between such airlines may facilitate collusion on price and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. The contribution of our paper is to put...

We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

We analyze a model where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

Family firms, which are prevalent around the world both for small organizations and large corporations, are usually more performant than other types of firms. This paper draws on altruism and on the theory of incentives contracting to explain why family firms perform better. Assuming that...

Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...