Showing 1 - 10 of 13
We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010484493
We examine wage bargaining when employers and labor unions do not always take all general equilibrium effects into account but learn a steady state. If agents do hardly consider general equilibrium effects, low real wages and low unemployment results. With an intermediate view, when partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011391642
Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399478
We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405183
We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001551712
We examine wage bargaining when employers and labor unions do not always take all general equilibrium effects into account but learn a steady state. If agents do hardly consider general equilibrium effects, low real wages and low unemployment results. With an intermediate view, when partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001579861
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002816502
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001744800