We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with...

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...

We analyze a simple and tractable model of occupational choice in the presence of credit market imperfections. We examine the effect of parameters governing technology and transaction costs, and history, in terms of the initial wealth distribution, in determining the long-term wealth...

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with...

We investigate the interaction between labor and credit market imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment within the framework of the "right-to-manage" approach. Our analysis highlights the critical role of labor mobility for the evaluation of the employment implications of...