In this paper we offer an explanation for the empirical anomaly that most raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally choose to...

We document the reversal of privatization in China—local governments re-possessing ownership stakes in a quarter of previously privatized firms from 1998–2007. Privatized firms are ‘renationalized' to ease the burden of unemployment in local labor markets. Firms located in provinces with a...

We document large-scale reversal of privatization in China — local governments taking back shares in a quarter of previously privatized firms. Politicians who are not affiliated with any of the dominant political factions are more likely to waver under pressure and adopt renationalization...

We investigate the power structure of the Chinese political system and its implications on corporate sectors. We document large-scale ‘re-nationalization' — local government re-possessing controlling ownership stakes in previously privatized firms during the period 1999-2007. Firms located...

We offer an explanation for why raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target firm's value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally acquire a small toehold even if the acquisition...