We develop a dynamic model of investment, cash holdings, financing, and risk management policies in which firms face financing frictions and are subject to permanent and temporary cash flow shocks. In this model, target cash holdings depend on the long-term prospects of the firm, implying that...

We develop a model in which a startup firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is generally preferred to equity financing, unless the platform expects strong cash flows or faces severe...

We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. We show that permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects on corporate policies and use the model to...

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or...

Theory has recently shown that corporate policies should depend on firms' exposure to short- and long-lived cash flow shocks and the correlation between these shocks. We provide granular estimates of these parameters for Compustat firms using a new filter that uses only cash flow data and the...

How much of a loan should a lender dynamically retain and how does retention affect loan performance? We address these questions in a dynamic agency model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and...