collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition … will intensify if both banks collateralize. Moreover, bank competition is welfare improving if collateralization is rather …

collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition … will intensify if both banks collateralize. Moreover, bank competition is welfare improving if collateralization is rather …

The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors … are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized … effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional …

moral hazard model in which the bank's incentive to mitigate political risk is highest with a non-recourse project finance …-lateral development banks indeed represent a “political umbrella” …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a …

We show that firms' credit market experience determines their perception of aggregate bank lending policy using panel …

We study how firms' individual credit market experience influences their beliefs about the bank lending policy, using …