This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interests affect the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that the appointment of affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker...

Using a comprehensive hedge fund activism dataset, we find that activist hedge funds are about 52% more likely to target firms with female CEOs compared to firms with male CEOs. We find that firm fundamentals, the existence of a “glass cliff,” gender discrimination bias, and hedge fund...

We investigate how shareholder-and-debtholder conflicts of interest affect corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. We find that appointing affiliated banker directors, but not unaffiliated banker directors,...