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Pricing and investments in matching markets
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 535-590
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686665
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina; Dianat, Ahrash; Samuelson, Larry; … - 2021
We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415563
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Pricing and investments in matching markets
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019204
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Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221543
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Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach
Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Narita, Yusuke - Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, … - 2011
We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school becomes more preferred by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353445
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"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751337
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Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686932
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Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013
We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700277
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Vacancies in supply chain networks
Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 3, pp. 354-357
We use the supply chain matching framework to study the effects of firm exit. We show that the exit of an initial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664125
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Testing substitutability
Hatfield, John William; Immorlica, Nicole; Kominers, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 639-645
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only to an agentʼs choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049779