This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. We argue that a viable European fiscal union can be constructed without joint liability for public debt or a centralized government with a large common budget. Such a fiscal union should combine elements of market discipline...

There are at least two reasons why sustainability of public debt is an issue of increasing importance. First, public choice considerations show the danger of excessive use of deficit finance in a democracy. Second, the conditions of a European Monetary Union imply further incentives for deficit...

Die Bestimmungen zur europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) im Unionsvertrag haben die Anreize für öffentliche Verschuldung verändert. Die Analyse zeigt, daß trotz der Bemühungen, die nationale Eigenverantwortlichkeit zu bewahren, nicht mit einer effektiven Disziplinierung...

There are at least two reasons why sustainability of public debt is an issue of increasing importance. First, public choice considerations show the danger of an excessive use of deficit finance in a democracy. Second, the conditions of a European Monetary Union (EMU) imply further incentives for...

This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. The proposal addresses the shortcomings of most other reform designs which do not offer a solution for insolvent or noncooperative euro countries. We suggest a design which combines fiscal insurance with an orderly procedure to...

We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules. Based on 30 studies published in the last decade, we offer a consensus estimate with respect to the level of statistical significance, provide suggestive evidence for the effect size, and identify study...