Unemployment insurance (UI) sanctions in the form of benefit reductions are intended to set disincentives for UI recipients to stay unemployed. Empirical evidence about the effects of UI sanctions in Germany is sparse. Using administrative data we investigate the effects of sanctions on the...

Dieses Papier erläutert die praktische Umsetzung des Konzeptes der Einstellungsgutscheine (Kieler Arbeitspapier 1302 "Comparing the Effectiveness of Employment Subsidies" von Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl und Dennis Snower). Nach unserem Konzept werden den Arbeitgebern bei der Einstellung von...

Der Ansatz favorisiert befristete Lohnkostenzuschüsse für neu eingestellte Langzeitarbeitslose bzw. für gering qualifizierte Arbeitslose. Diese sollen Arbeitgebern in Form von Einstellungsgutscheinen gewährt werden. Von der gezielten Reduzierung der Arbeitskosten versprechen sich die Autoren...

Der Ansatz favorisiert befristete Lohnkostenzuschüsse für neu eingestellte Langzeitarbeitslose bzw. für gering qualifizierte Arbeitslose. Diese sollen Arbeitgebern in Form von Einstellungsgutscheinen gewährt werden. Von der gezielten Reduzierung der Arbeitskosten versprechen sich die Autoren...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

This paper shows that the matching function and the Beveridge curve in the United States exhibit strong nonlinearities over the business cycle. These patterns can be replicated by enhancing a search and matching model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks for new contacts. Large negative...