Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Dieser Bericht untersucht, welche Art von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen Arbeitslo-sengeld-II-Empfängerinnen und -Empfänger innehatten, bevor und nachdem sie in den Grundsicherungsbezug übergingen. Die Studie konzentriert sich dabei auf Menschen, die im Jahr 2012 neu Grundsicherung bezogen,...