Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level : (i)...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the...

Using recursive estimation and rolling windows over extended sample periods we examine the time-varying relationship between spot and short-term forward prices in the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland (PJM) wholesale electricity market. We examine theoretical models of forward risk premia in...

This paper uses high frequency spot price data from eight wholesale electricity markets in Australia, Canada, and the United States to estimate realized volatility and the frequency of price spikes. I find similar levels of realized volatility in Australia and North America, with estimates...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the...

We use high frequency real time spot prices and day-ahead forward prices from the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland wholesale electricity market to calculate, describe, and forecast spot price volatility. We introduce the concept of forward realized volatility calculated from day-ahead...

We examine investment incentives and market power in an experimental market. We characterize market power as the strategic interdependence of subjects' investment decisions and output decisions. The market is designed so that investment and output decisions can be jointly characterized as...

We examine investment incentives and market power in an experimental market. We characterize market power as the strategic interdependence of subjects' investment decisions and output decisions. The market is designed so that investment and output decisions can be jointly characterized as...