The practices of preferencing, internalization, and best execution have been criticized as causing worse execution in dealership markets like NASDAQ relative to auction style markets like the NYSE. We study the quality of executions and the profitability of market making for internalized,...

Using London Stock Exchange data, we test the central implication of the canonical model of Ho and Stoll (1983) that relative inventory differences determine dealer behavior. We find that relative inventories explain which dealers obtain large trades and show that movements between best ask,...

This paper presents a two stage trading model of a competitive dealership market. In the first stage, one among a group of risk averse market makers executes a public trade which contains some information. Details of this trade are not publicly disclosed. In the second stage, an inter-dealer...

In dealership markets disclosure of size and price details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyse a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a...

The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we find that preferenced trades pay higher...