This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a...

In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir, warum Staaten Anreize haben, Umweltverschmutzung zu besteuern anstatt Umweltverschmutzungsrechte zu veräußern. Unser Modell berücksichtigt, dass Regierungen sowohl umweltpolitische Ziele als auch fiskalische oder industriepolitische Motive haben können. Wir...

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a budget oriented Government. Pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and a pollution tax is seen as being equivalent to leasing out pollution permits. First, a general model is developed, and then...