An exchange economy with three equilibrium points is considered. The core of this economy is studied under replication. It is shown that the core splits into separate segments after 5 and then 12 replications and that convergences proceeds at different rates towards the three equilibria.

In a previous essay we modeled the enforcement of contract, and through it the provision of money and markets, as a production function within the society, the scale of which is optimized endogenously by labor allocation away from primary production of goods. Government and a central bank...

The competitive market structure of a decentralized economy is converted into a self-policing system treating the bureaucracy and enforcement of the legal system endogenously. In particular we consider money systems as constructs to make agents' economic strategies predictable from knowledge of...

In a previous essay we modeled the enforcement of contract, and through it the provision of money and markets, as a production function within the society, the scale of which is optimized endogenously by labor allocation away from primary production of goods. Government and a central bank...

The competitive market structure of a decentralized economy is converted into a self-policing system treating the bureaucracy and enforcement of the legal system endogenously. In particular we consider money systems as constructs to make agents' economic strategies predictable from knowledge of...

We argue that even when macroeconomic variables are constant, underlying microeconomic uncertainty and borrowing constraints generate inflation. We study stochastic economies with fiat money, a central bank, one nondurable commodity, countably many time periods, and a continuum of agents. The...

A discussion is given of the problems involved in the formal modeling of the innovation process. The link between innovation and finance is stressed. The nature of how the circular flow of funds is broken and the role of finance in evaluation and control is discussed.

The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties to appririate credit limits and default penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that...

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.