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Management control and innovative activity
Czarnitzki, Dirk - 2000
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428380
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An empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity : who invests more into R&D - the incumbent or the challenger?
Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2000
The theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the (potential) entrant invests more into R&D has attracted considerable interest. This paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 German firms over the years 1992 to 1995....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444512
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Co-determination and innovation
Kraft, Kornelius; Stank, Jörg; Dewenter, Ralf - 2009
This paper examines the effect of the German co-determination law of 1976 (MitbestG) on the innovative activity of German firms. Co-determination applies to firms with 2000 employees or more. Data from 1971-1976 and 1981-1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288477
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Sources of spillovers for imitation and innovation
Cappellin, Riccardo; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2013
market (innovation). It turns out that spillovers from rivals lead to more imitation, while inputs from customers and … research institutions enhance original innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787404
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Co-determination and Innovation
Kraft, Kornelius; Stank, Jörg; Dewenter, Ralf - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
This paper examines the effect of the German co-determination law of 1976 (MitbestG) on the innovative activity of German firms. Co-determination applies to firms with 2000 employees or more. Data from 1971-1976 and 1981-1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008578125
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Management Control and Innovative Activity
Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2000
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297732
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Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation
Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2011
as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010304456
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Sources of spillovers for imitation and innovation
Cappelli, Riccardo; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2013
market (innovation). It turns out that spillovers from rivals lead to more imitation, while inputs from customers and … research institutions enhance original innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319604
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Management control and innovative activity
Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2000
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445230
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Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation
Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - 2011
as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. -- Corporate governance ; managerial ownership ; entrenchment ; innovation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008938024