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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Diehl, Christoph; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2013
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193243
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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
Diehl, Christoph; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 4, pp. 911-925
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665410
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The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria
Diehl, Christoph - 2015
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034859
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Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Games and economic behavior 143 (2024), pp. 51-76
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014450004
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Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination With Private Values
Kuzmics, Christoph; Heller, Yuval - 2022
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We … characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with preplay communication in which players have private preferences over … the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082630
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Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2021
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We … characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over … the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210917