In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary for producers to define product quality. Standard theory maintains that: (i) in a duopoly there will be a quality leader no matter whether the product can incorporate one or two vertical attributes;...

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s...

In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the misperception of quality, while, the investment in green...

We extend Fujiwara's (2008) model to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, generalising his result that steady state feedback outputs are lower than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibrium outputs for any...

We revisit Fujiwaraís (2008) differential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identified by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by firms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum...

We reformulate the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model of natural resource extraction under the alternative assumptions of Cournot behaviour and perfect competition, to revisit the tragedy of commons vs the possibility of sustainable harvesting. We stress the different impact of demand elasticity on...

The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage....

We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms non-cooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, in which...

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluting emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then...

We extend Fujiwara's (2008) model to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, generalizing his result that steady state feedback outputs are lower than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibrium outputs for any...