We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We … matchings for the underlying marriage market. We show that this is the case if and only if there is a unique stable matching …

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs …

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models with search frictions. …

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We … matchings for the underlying marriage market. We show that this is the case if and only if there is a unique stable matching …

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs … static results of the decentralized trading outcome with respect to the level of the search frictions. -- Dynamic Matching …