of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main … factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor …, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can …

mutual fund ownership in reducing corporate fraud activities among listed firms in China. This confirms that fund managers … after firms are penalized by the regulatory authorities for corporate fraud. We also observe that this effect is more …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …