In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supplybehavior which fully accounts for the eects of income tax and transfers on la-bor supply incentives. Additionally, the model recognizes the demand side drivenrationing risk that might prevent individuals from realizing...

In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply behavior which fully accounts for the effects of income tax and transfers on labor supply incentives. Additionally, the model recognizes the demand side driven rationing risk that might prevent individuals from...

In this paper we develop a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply behavior which fully accounts for the effect of income tax and transfers on labor supply incentives. Additionally, the model recognizes the demand side driven rationing risk that might prevent individuals from...

In this paper we use a dynamic structural life-cycle model to analyze the employment,fiscal and welfare effects induced by unemployment insurance. The model features a detailedspecification of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance benefitswhich depend on an individual's...

Individuals vary considerably in how much they earn during their lifetimes. We study how the tax-and-transfer system o sets inequalities in lifetime earnings, which would otherwise translate into differences in living standards. Based on a life-cycle model, we find that redistribution by taxes...

We empirically analyze the optimal mix and optimal generosity of unemployment insurance and social assistance programs. To do so, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply, savings, and social assistance claiming decisions of singles and married couples. Partial insurance...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married...