This article presents a benchmarking model for measuring the efficiency of organizations that provide humanitarian aid. The model was developed and implemented in the framework of a large international aid program. The model is based on measuring the labor productivity of each organization that...

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of...

This article presents a benchmarking model for measuring the efficiency of organizations that provide humanitarian aid. The model was developed and implemented in the framework of a large international aid program. The model is based on measuring the labor productivity of each organization that...

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for...