Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative nonexpected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricing data instead of...

Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative nonexpected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricing data instead of...

Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative non-expected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricing data instead...

Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative non-expected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricing data instead...

Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choice data in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative nonexpected utility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricing data instead of...

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self‐interest should produce a sub‐optimal outcome absent sanctions for non‐cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically...

In the context of eliciting preferences for decision making under risk, we ask the question: "which might be the 'best' method for eliciting such preferences?". It is well known that different methods differ in terms of the bias in the elicitation; it is rather less well-known that different...

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...