Showing 1 - 10 of 16
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107
degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions …)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509134
We explore whether buyer groups, in which firms legally purchase inputs jointly, facilitate collusion in the product … credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments in a three … as a main factor causing collusive product markets. -- buyer groups ; cartels ; collusion ; communication ; experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661278
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724
degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions …)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228135
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844753
Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012021639
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011802796
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929323
Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012548186