We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common … identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher … identities. We find no effect on cooperation when only part of the followers share the leader's identity, or when followers share …

We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. Voluntary participation … may foster cooperation through an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an … the effectiveness of these mechanisms in a one-shot public goods experiment. Voluntary participation has a positive effect …

cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit … examine the relative effectiveness of these two mechanisms in a one-shot, two-person public goods game experiment. We find …

We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. Voluntary participation … may foster cooperation through a mechanism of assortative selection of interaction partners based on false consensus bias … the effectiveness of these mechanisms in a one-shot public goods experiment. Voluntary participation has a positive effect …

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …